PHILOSOPHY / INFORMATION / AGENCY
THE
UNFINISHED
REAL
Three essays on reality, will
and possible futures

Three essays examining the relationship between the alternatives we can conceive, the ends that govern an action and the capacity to intervene in a shared world.
The question running through the volume
Under what conditions can a represented possibility participate in a decision, be attributed to a will, and legitimately alter a shared world?
Existence, causal efficacy, practical authorship, subjective experience and legitimacy raise different questions. Their relationship helps specify what changes, who intervenes and to whom that intervention must be justified.
Prologue · Before it exists
Excerpt from the prologue
Let us imagine a city divided by a river. On a table lie three documents: a record of the journeys its inhabitants make, a drawing of a bridge, and an authorization that has yet to be signed. The people in the room can touch the paper. No one can cross the river on that drawing. Yet something is already happening: budgets are being discussed, routes are being proposed, benefits are being anticipated, someone fears losing their home, and someone else imagines getting to work sooner.
The bridge does not exist as a structure that can be crossed. The record exists as information about journeys. The authorization, if it were issued through the appropriate procedure, would change what certain people can do. All three objects are present; their functions are not equivalent. Confusing them would produce a poor engineering project and poor philosophy as well.
Now let us add an artificial system that compares alternatives. It can propose a bridge, a boat, or improvements to an existing crossing. It can estimate costs and revise its recommendations. The people in the room begin to say that the system “prefers” one solution. They then claim that it “wants” to optimize mobility. Is this a convenient way of speaking? A justified attribution of self-direction? A human projection onto a device whose purpose belongs entirely to those who deployed it?
We do not settle the question by observing that its recommendation changed the meeting. Many things produce consequences without wanting them. Nor do we settle it by repeating that it was designed: the causal history of something does not, on its own, explain every property of its present organization. We need to know what intervenes, how it intervenes, and what warrants describing it in one way rather than another.
Finally, suppose the city decides not to build the bridge. It discovers a problem that the drawing had concealed and chooses another alternative. The structure never materializes. Even so, its representation will have consumed time, reorganized expectations, and opened a discussion. An object absent from the material world as a bridge will have been present as the content of a real process. This is the paradox that gives the third essay its title, and also the reason not to take that title literally.
The three questions are thus kept separate. The first concerns the world we inherit: what warrants treating a configuration as final simply because it already exists? The second concerns those who intervene: what organization would justify speaking of will rather than mere efficacy? The third concerns what guides the intervention: how does a possibility become operative without attributing physical powers to what does not exist?
Coda · Not every transformation is emancipation
The scene brings the essays together without turning them into a single grand thesis. The first challenges a modal and normative inference: existing does not establish that something is inevitable or justified. The second examines an attribution: producing effects does not establish that something has ends of its own. The third studies a causal relationship: absent content does not act by itself; present systems organized in relation to that content are what act.
These propositions do not form a ladder that automatically ends in artificial consciousness. A city can be transformed through processes no one planned. A project can be realized without any of its instruments having a will. A will can fail. An experience can exist without producing the visible transformation we expected. The architecture of this volume must preserve these possibilities because they are part of what it seeks to explain.
The result is an inquiry into three relationships worth studying together. Representations delimit alternatives for action; agents or systems organize the ends governing them; institutions distribute capacity and authority to intervene. Each relationship introduces its own questions and may alter the others. That articulation allows us to examine how a possibility becomes operative and what responsibilities arise when it transforms shared conditions.
The authorization is still on the table. Deciding now requires examining the drawing, the crossing’s conditions and the reasons of those who would be displaced. It also requires knowing which criteria guided the system’s recommendation and which other alternatives could be considered. Signing might open a benefit and consolidate a loss; postponement might preserve one harm, avoid another or permit a better option. The essays converge at that point. The world admits interventions, ends require attribution and represented possibilities begin distributing consequences before materializing.
There is no formula that eliminates the obligation to judge. That is the conclusion, not a deficiency that can be corrected by adding more computing power.
The world is not a verdict. But every intervention helps write the conditions that others will have to inhabit.
References for this selection
02 Arendt, H. (1998). The Human Condition (2nd ed.; introduction by M. Canovan). University of Chicago Press. Original work published in 1958.
05 Beckert, J. (2013). Imagined futures: Fictional expectations in the economy. Theory and Society, 42, 219–240.
08 Chalmers, D. J. (2011). A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition. Author’s version of a 1993 manuscript, with a note added in 2011.
21 Landauer, R. (1996). The physical nature of information. Physics Letters A, 217, 188–193.
24 Merton, R. K. (1948). The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy. The Antioch Review, 8(2), 193–210.
29 Popa, E. (2021). Human Goals Are Constitutive of Agency in Artificial Intelligence (AI). Philosophy & Technology, 34, 1731–1750.
31 Searle, J. R. (2005). What is an institution? Journal of Institutional Economics, 1(1), 1–22.
32 Seth, A. K. (2025). Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Advance online publication.
33 Shannon, C. E. (1948). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. The Bell System Technical Journal, 27, 379–423 and 623–656.